The following is a perspective by Ted Gerarden,
formerly the Director of the Office of the Consumer Advocate at the Postal
Rate Commission. The views
expressed are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Commission, this publication, or the Association for Postal Commerce.
Change is on the horizon for the Postal Service.
The events of 2001, competing concepts on the best course for postal
reform, and the much-anticipated transformation plan are mileposts on the
journey to the future of the U.S. Postal Service. Meanwhile, product redefinition is expected to lead to a
significant reclassification of mail services.
The shape and scope of the Postal Service of the 21st
century is a work in progress—at this point, the only certainty is that
there will be change.
The American public has an
enormous stake in future of the Postal Service.
That interest, however, has very limited representation.
Public interest advocacy groups do not devote resources to defining the
scope of universal service, the structure of the Postal Service, the terms for
services provided to the public, or the rates charged for mail and special
services. Instead, such groups
target limited but high profile issues such as sweepstakes promotions,
executive bonuses, CMAs, or mail fraud. The
reason is simple—the average American household spends less than $5 per
month on postage and enjoys highly reliable mail service.
Public interest groups naturally limit their postal involvement and put
their resources to work on other matters.
The only regular representation of the public is at the Postal Rate
Commission, which by statute is required to appoint an “officer of the
Commission” to represent “the interests of the general public” in
certain proceedings before the Commission.
The Commission currently accomplishes this through the Office of the
Consumer Advocate. Although part
of the Commission, the OCA is subject to the ex parte rules and
effectively is separated from the substantive work of the rest of the
Commission.
The OCA is subject to
various limitations. It has no
clear or consistent mandate on how it should represent the public interest, no
express authority to conduct investigations or file complaints, no access to
subpoena power, no independent resources, and no authority to appeal adverse
USPS decisions. Nor is the OCA a
permanent office; the Commission could dissolve the office and return to its
earlier practice of appointing staff to cases on an ad hoc basis, or
develop a new approach to the “officer of the Commission” requirement.
Postal reform legislation has
proposed changes in the nature of the Commission, but has not yet considered
the question of how the public should be represented before the Commission or
elsewhere. H.R. 22 and the
current discussion draft retain the undefined “officer of the Commission”
approach. The only specific
change is the modest addition of express authority to file complaints.
Reform legislation, however, offers an opportunity to address the both
the nature and scope of public interest representation.
A more effective approach
would be to assign the task of representing the public interest to the staff
of the Federal Trade Commission. Congress
could give the FTC express direction and a mandate to represent the public
interest before the Postal Service and Congress, as well as the Commission.
There are several advantages
that the FTC would bring to these tasks.
The FTC has significant staff expertise in the disciplines used in
postal analysis, such as economics, econometrics, statistics, antitrust, and
regulatory litigation. Congress already charges the FTC with consumer protection
functions under more than 30 different statutes (including mailing of
unordered merchandise under the Postal Reorganization Act). The orientation and organization of the FTC make it a natural
to provide overall consumer protection in the postal arena.
One change contemplated by
reform legislation highlights the advantages of involving the FTC.
The proposed Postal Regulatory Commission would hold hearings to
categorize postal products as competitive or non-competitive.
This calls for significant antitrust analysis and expertise.
The current Commission has no special expertise in this area, but the
FTC does—and could provide valuable guidance to the Commission in such
hearings. Such involvement would
be similar to existing statutes under which Congress has directed the FTC to
provide antitrust views to other government agencies.
Properly structured, the FTC
staff would act pursuant to a Congressional mandate, independent of the
interests of the Postal Service, the Commission, and postal parties.
Given appropriate authority by Congress, the FTC could file appeals of
Postal Service or Commission decisions, thus giving courts the opportunity to
rule on issues of concern to the public interest.
Funding would be approved by Congress as part of the FTC’s budget,
and could be reimbursed from the Postal Fund.
Yet actions by the staff would be subject to oversight by the FTC
itself, thus providing desirable government control of this important public
function.
None of the active
participants in the debate over the future of the Postal Service has any
particular reason to focus on improving the representation of the public.
Congress has both the opportunity and obligation to consider this
important issue as postal reform is debated.
Vigorous, expert, and independent action by the staff of the FTC would
assure that the public voice on future postal issues will be heard.